Protocol verifiers check whether a protocol meets a security goal under stated trust assumptions, such as that a key is never leaked, a value is fresh, or a channel is authentic. They do not say which of those assumptions the goal needs. Rowe, Guttman and Liskov asked for the weakest assumptions under which a protocol …
A cryptographic secret is issued for a purpose but grants a capability, and the capability is usually larger: a decryption key meant for computing aggregates can read every record, and a token meant to pay one invoice can drain the account. Deployed systems state the purpose in policy and enforce only the capability. W …
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical settings, yet their black-box nature makes it difficult to provide formal guaranties about their behavior. Existing verification approaches rely primarily on empirical probing and testing, leaving open the question of how to reason rigorously abo …