Backdoored large language models (LLMs) can behave normally on benign inputs while producing attacker-specified outputs under hidden triggers. Existing defenses span four stages--prior-training, in-training, post-training, and inference-time--and share one of two underlying strategies: either suppress backdoor learning …
As vibe coding becomes increasingly capable and widespread, security vulnerabilities in even functionally correct solutions are a growing concern. When investigating functionally correct but insecure solutions, we find that the insecure agent is less than half as likely to conduct effective planning and testing for the …
People learn not only by repeating successful actions, but also by recounting and explaining their experiences, revising their understanding to guide future behavior. Can a language-model agent improve its future actions by training only on explanations of its own experience? We investigate this question by studying Re …
Scaling the horizon of agentic LLMs is bottlenecked by the need to fit ever longer context traces in GPU memory. Context compaction has been the most popular mechanism to alleviate this issue, keeping GPU memory constant for a given trace. Unfortunately, most compaction strategies rely on prefilling the LLM context man …