Backdooring Sparse Autoencoders

Abstract

Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are increasingly used not only to interpret language models but also to intervene on their internal representations. We show that this creates a supply-chain attack surface: a maliciously modified SAE can induce attacker-chosen behavior when inserted into the forward pass of an otherwise unchanged language model. We introduce a decoder-only SAE backdoor that leaves both the underlying LLM and the SAE encoder frozen, restricting the attack to a single auxiliary component at a single insertion layer. Using code generation as a case study, we demonstrate high rates of unsolicited code insertion across three language models and a wide range of insertion layers, as well as trigger-dependent behavior conditioned on a prompt cue. We further evaluate the modified SAEs using HumanEval and selected SAEBench metrics. While attack effectiveness varies across models and layers, strong backdoor behavior can coexist with relatively small changes in several conventional SAE quality measures. These results establish that SAEs can carry behavioral backdoors without modifying the language model itself and should therefore be treated as security-sensitive components.

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