TwinGuard-Lite: بوابة قبول الحالة القائمة على القواعد للتوائم الرقمية التوليدية للمرضى

الملخص

تمت ترجمة أجزاء من هذه الصفحة آلياً وقد تحتوي على أخطاء.

Future generative patient digital twins may combine longitudinal health records with language-model agents and keep information across sessions. The wording of a proposed update does not reveal whether it comes from an allowed source, conflicts with the patient's record, or belongs to someone else. We present TwinGuard-Lite, a rule-based gateway that admits an update to a twin's persistent state only if it passes checkable approximations of two integrity properties. Grounded state consistency (GSC) is approximated by a provenance check and a contradiction check; cross-patient noninterference (CPN) is approximated by a namespace check against trusted transport metadata. We evaluate three attack families over 20 seeded person-level splits of a semi-synthetic stream built from the openly licensed eICU database demo, with 29,131 $\pm$ 2706 candidate updates per seed. A keyword filter and an anomaly detector detect 16% and 24% of attacks, respectively; a provenance-only ablation detects 59.9% but misses every cross-patient attack. Combining GSC and CPN yields 99.1% precision, 90.5% recall, a 94.6% F1 score, and a 0.033% false-positive rate. Every attack the full gateway admits falsely claims a trusted source; when the retrieval channel does so, 92.9% of retrieval attacks are admitted. The results hold under stated trust assumptions, and no language model, agent, or retriever is executed: TwinGuard-Lite is a mechanism-level proof of concept that motivates authenticated, patient-bound ingestion, not a clinical safeguard.

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